Operational Security in Modern Warfare: Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

Authors

  • Dwi Erita Millynia Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia
  • Agung Risdhianto Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia
  • Editha Praditya Duarte Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia
  • Hikmat Zakky Almubaroq Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55927/fjmr.v4i4.133

Keywords:

Defense Management, Intelligence Gathering, Operational Security, Risk Management

Abstract

The evolution of modern warfare, particularly in the Ukraine-Russia War, highlights the crucial role of Operations Security (OPSEC) in addressing vulnerabilities from the growing reliance on cyber technologies, portable devices, and social media. While these tools enhance efficiency and situational awareness, they also introduce risks through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). This study identifies key vulnerabilities in smartphones, commercial radios, platforms like Discord, social media apps like Strava, and drones like DJI. It emphasizes the need for OPSEC measures, including military-standard equipment, secure communication, and proper training. Examples from the Ukraine-Russia War, such as the use of modified drones for kamikaze missions and unencrypted communication, demonstrate the importance of robust risk management. Additionally, proprietary networks like NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and JWICS offer effective mitigation. This journal stresses that while modern technology is vital in Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW), its vulnerabilities must be managed through OPSEC frameworks to ensure security, maintain information superiority, and achieve mission success.

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Published

2025-04-30

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