

## **Analysis of Assumptions from the Perspective of Democratic Resilience: the Expansion of Civilian Positions that Can Be Occupied by Active Military Personnel in the Revision of Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Defense Forces**

Bagus Ridho Akustyo<sup>1\*</sup>, Palupi Lindiasari Samputra<sup>2</sup>  
School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia  
**Corresponding Author:** Bagus Ridho Akustyo [bagus.ridho@ui.ac.id](mailto:bagus.ridho@ui.ac.id)

---

### ARTICLE INFO

*Keywords:* Assumptions, Civil-Military Control, Democracy, Law, Military

*Received :* 17, February  
*Revised :* 03, March  
*Accepted:* 23, March

©2025 Akustyo, Samputra: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).



### ABSTRACT

This research aims to identify the policy actors of the policy on the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army in the Revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army, identify the assumptions that arise, conflicting assumptions, and formulate a new conceptualization of the problem and potential solutionists. This research uses qualitative assumption analysis of secondary data obtained through electronic media searches between May 2024 and January 2025. The search results identified 13 data that matched the research. The results revealed eight policy actors and three conflicting assumptions. The new concept of the problem identified is the expansion of military power, which can reduce civilian control over the military. This will reduce the ability of the balance of power to avoid government actors who can hijack democracy in an autocratic system of government.

---

## **INTRODUCTION**

National resilience in the context of Indonesia is a term that shows the ability of a country to survive, adjust, rise again and become more resilient in the face of various forms of shocks such as economic, social, political, ideological shocks, globalization, external military attacks, terrorism, radicalism and disease attacks from within and outside the country (Hanita, 2020) . A factor that affects national resilience is the existence of democracy in the country. Democracy plays an important role in increasing the legitimacy of the government that obtains the mandate of the people through direct elections, encourages social and political stability, and allows the country to effectively withstand various threats (Romdoni & Runturambi, 2024).

The democratic control of the armed forces and security sector is one of the characteristics of democracy that distinguishes it from all types of autocratic regimes (Arinanto, 2024). Civilian control over military power in authoritarian and democratic regimes differs substantially. In authoritarian regimes, civilian control over military power is often exercised through personal networks of power. In democratic regimes, civilian control over the military must be formally institutionalized, enshrined, and rooted in applicable laws and regulations so that it can be accounted for (Gunawan, 2017). Civil-military relations in the democracy that Indonesia has undergone since independence have experienced a transition that tends to lead to strengthening military professionalism (Mukhtar, 2017) . Demilitarization during the reform-era Pancasila Democracy in Indonesia was responded by the Indonesian National Army (TNI), formerly ABRI, by changing its fundamental doctrine before the reform era, including the dual function that became the basis for legitimizing the political power of the previous regime (Arinanto, 2024).

The service of Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions, which will be abolished in the new Indonesian national army paradigm, has been limited to certain positions according to Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army (TNI). On Tuesday, May 28, 2024, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) approved the Draft Law on Amendments to Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as an initiative proposal bill of the DPR RI in the 18th Plenary Meeting of Session V Year 2023-2024. One of the main points of change is the expansion of civilian positions that can be filled by active Indonesian national army soldiers, as seen in the proposed amendment to Article 47 paragraph (2), which adds the sentence "as well as other ministries/institutions that require the energy and expertise of active Soldiers in accordance with the President's policy(Mabruri, 2024). The latest draft revision of Law No. 34/2004 on TNI (RUU TNI) accommodates provisions that allow soldiers to occupy civilian positions in ministries/institutions at the president's discretion. Members of Commission I of the House of Representatives argued that the proposed revision of Law No. 34/2004 is a form of adjustment for the increase in ministries and institutions following the law. This adjustment will provide space for new ministries/institutions, such as the BNPT, to be filled by active Indonesian national army soldiers (Sutrisna & Rastika, 2024) . The revision of this law is also

related to several new regulations that regulate the involvement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in it, such as Law Number 32 of 2014 concerning Maritime Affairs, Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Perppu Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law, and Law Number 11 of 2021 concerning Amendments to Law Number 16 of 2004 concerning Prosecutors. The aforementioned regulations mandate the involvement of active Indonesian national army soldiers, but these Ministries/Institutions are not listed in Law Number 34 on Indonesian national army (Achmad, 2024; Fitri, 2024).

The employment of active duty soldiers raises concerns about the decline of democracy in Indonesia because the employment of active duty soldiers existed until the authoritarian era of the Pancasila Democracy of the New Order. Several studies have been conducted on the entry of active Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian positions. Research conducted by Novavah (2020) found that the entry of active Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian positions could risk restoring the ABRI dual function, which was abolished in the reform era. When the ABRI dual function was abolished after the collapse of the new order regime, there were problems within the Indonesian national army, where high- and middle-ranking officers lost their positions so that non-job officers accumulated. However, the solution was the issuance of Law Number 34 of 2004, which actually returned the employment of these officers to civilian positions. In addition to the risk of restoring ABRI's dual function, this could also lead to internal jealousy in the civilian government and damage Indonesian national army's career pattern in ministries/institutions.

Syahrul dan Goncing (2020) found that the issue of the dual function of the military has become stronger on the 2019 political agenda. However, military involvement in civilian positions tends to be forced and political. In addition, research conducted by Bagus dan kawan-kawan (2021) found that the entry of active Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian positions can result in disruption of the implementation of the merit system in the management of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN). Filling positions that should be filled by the ASN but are held by active Indonesian national army and Polri soldiers will reduce opportunities for civil servants to receive promotions through the career system. Another study by Amran and friends (2022) revealed a different side. His research found that changes to the norms of Law Number 34 of 2004 still need to be made to adjust to existing developments. This change is made to be able to accommodate the determination of civilian institutions that can be filled by active Indonesian national army soldiers so that positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers can be limited to institutions that require special expertise and skills from Indonesian national army soldiers.

of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army and the absence of previous research discussing this matter, it is necessary to conduct research with an assumption approach in analyzing policies related to the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active

Indonesian national army in the Revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army. So that the purpose of this research is to identify policy actors related to the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by the active Indonesian national army. The resilience of democracy in Indonesia in the context of civil-military relations which has the potential to experience shocks as a result of the discourse on the expansion, identify assumptions that arise related to the policy; analyze the opposition of assumptions; and formulate a new conceptualization of the problems and potential solutions from the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by the active Indonesian national army in the Revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### ***Democracy***

Democracy itself is simply defined as a type of government where people come together to form laws that govern themselves (Axtmann, 2022). Furthermore, democracy is defined into four main approaches: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented. (1) The constitutional approach will focus on the laws related to the political activities of the regime at the time. This approach involves the disclosure of political information and public participation in government processes. (2) The substantive approach focuses on the living and political conditions that a regime promotes. A democratic regime will offer human welfare, individual freedom, security, justice, social equality, public deliberation, and peaceful conflict resolution. (3) The procedural approach views democracy in narrow terms, such as elections. When elections are held in government, this view considers the country to have practiced democracy. (4) The process approach views democracy as an ongoing process. Robert Dahl presents five process criteria that must be passed in democracy: effective participation, equality of voting, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and involvement of adults (Tilly, 2007).

### ***Democracy Resilience***

A country can be said to have democratic resilience when its government is able to prevent and face challenges without losing the character of democracy itself (Merkel & Lührmann, 2021). Democratic resilience has four key characteristics – flexibility, recovery, adaptation, and innovation (Sisk, 2017). The flexible character means that democracy is able to absorb pressure, the recovery character is understood as the ability to overcome challenges or crises, the adaptive character means being able to change in response to pressures on the system, and the innovative character is defined as the ability to change using more effective and efficient ways to face challenges. Democratic resilience has five dimensions that must be maintained: (1) participatory engagement, which is realized by the existence of civil society participation, electoral participation, direct democracy, and subnational elections; (2) impartial administration, which is realized by the existence of predictable law enforcement and the absence of corruption; (3) representative government embodied by clean elections, exclusive suffrage, political party freedom, and elected government; (4) human rights

embodied by civil liberties, social rights and equality, and access to justice; and (5) governance oversight embodied by effective parliaments, judicial independence, and media integrity.

To make democracy resilient, there are at least four things that must be done: having resilient citizens, resilient institutions, designing resilience, and supporting resilience itself. Resilient citizens are civil societies that have strong social ties and are committed to democracy. When civil society is strong, it will be able to demand the fulfillment of their rights and protect their own rights. Resilient institutions attempt to institutionalize and strengthen power multiple that prevent government actors from hijacking democracy. An important factor is the democratic control of the armed forces and security sector and building the professionalism of these institutions under the control of democratically elected civilian authorities. Designing resilience involves drafting a constitution that maintains electoral integrity, building inclusive and resilient institutions, and establishing new avenues for public expression, representation, and participation. Supporting resilience is an effort to maintain democratic resilience by involving national and international actors so that democracy can run optimally in fast-changing social realities *checks and balances of* (Natalia dkk., 2018).

### ***Civil-Military Control***

Democratic control of the armed forces and the security sector is a characteristic of democracy that distinguishes it from all types of autonomous regimes. Democratic control in civil-military relations, termed "*control objective civilian*", entails the following: (1) high military professionalism and recognition by military officials of the professional boundaries of their field; (2) effective subordination of foreign and military policy making between the military and political leaders; (3) approval and recognition by political leaders of the military's professional autonomy and authority; resulting in (4) minimized military intervention in politics and vice versa (Arinanto, 2024). Civilian control over military power in authoritarian and democratic regimes has substantial differences. In authoritarian regimes, military control is often exercised through personal power networks. In a democratic regime, civilian control over the military must be formally institutionalized, enshrined and rooted in applicable laws and regulations so that it can be accounted for (Gunawan, 2017). By building or restoring public trust in democratic effectiveness and defending it against various alternative ideologies including authoritarian nationalism is the first step in increasing the resilience of a country's democracy. In addition, democratic resilience in the constitutional context is crucial for increasing the integrity of political competition and strengthen public control in democracy (Sisk, 2017).

The civil-military relationship in Indonesia's democracy since independence has undergone a transition that tends to lead to the strengthening of military professionalism. At the beginning of President Soekarno's reign, called the era of parliamentary democracy, the military still did not have firm boundaries regarding its involvement in civilian government. However, during this period, President Soekarno had warned the military not to become involved

in practical politics in order to maintain the stability of military power. Without clear boundaries, military organizations (formerly known as Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI) before becoming ABRI) were increasingly confident in playing political roles outside of their main military duties. The military's political position strengthened after Parliamentary Democracy was dissolved and replaced with Guided Democracy. During this period, the military gained a position in the government cabinet and, eventually, gave birth to the ABRI Dwifungsi. ABRI's socio-political policy at that time was to succeed in national development, strengthening Pancasila and national resilience, and this was implemented with ABRI's work where active soldiers were placed outside the Department of Defense and Security. This ABRI Dwifungsi concept opened up a new civil-military relationship that did not recognize civilian supremacy over the military. When entering the New Order period under the leadership of President Soeharto, who called for Pancasila Democracy, the political rights of ABRI were again restricted with the abolition of all political functions from ABRI headquarters and made President Soeharto the owner of full military power. However, even though politics had been restricted, the military was used by President Soeharto as a strong supporter of the Golkar group and high-ranking officers who were loyal and loyal to President Soeharto were given strategic positions which further showed that the military was used as a tool of power to stem the reform movement. The authoritarian nature of President Soeharto's government led senior military officers to argue for a review of ABRI's dual function and for the military to distance itself from civilian political power. President Soeharto rejected this proposal, continuing to hold on to his power. After the collapse of the New Order, the Indonesian government entered a reform era of Pancasila Democracy. At this time, military professionalism was strengthened by neutralizing the military from political activities so as not to distort political policy again (Mukhtar, 2017).

Demilitarization during the Pancasila Democracy of the reform era in Indonesia was responded by the Indonesian National Army (TNI), formerly the ABRI, by changing its fundamental doctrine before a reform era, including the dual function, which became the basis for legitimizing the political power of the previous regime. Indonesian national army developed a "new paradigm" as a guideline for its political activities consisting of five steps, namely (1) reduction of Indonesian national army -Polri representation in representative institutions; (2) elimination of the employment of Indonesian national army -Polri officers to civilian positions; (3) political neutrality; (4) separation of Police and Indonesian national army; and (5) orientation to defense. These five steps form a form of Indonesian national army's support for democratization in Indonesia and positively lead to civilian supremacy, which is a term that has always been avoided by military groups in the past (Arinanto, 2024).

## **METHODOLOGY**

This research analyzes policies using a qualitative method with an assumption analysis approach. The data used in this research are secondary data obtained from electronic media searches such as media coverage and opinions or

statements of relevant stakeholders related to research issues during the period May 2024 to January 2025. In addition, a literature review was conducted to deepen the discussion related to the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers.

Table 1. Research data sources

No.	Date	Title	Source
1	29-05-2024	Polemik Revisi UU TNI yang Tidak Menjawab Kebutuhan Objektif	<a href="https://tirto.id/polemik-revisi-uu-tni-yang-tidak-menjawab-kebutuhan-objektif-gY35">https://tirto.id/polemik-revisi-uu-tni-yang-tidak-menjawab-kebutuhan-objektif-gY35</a>
2	31-05-2024	Hentikan Pembahasan Revisi UU TNI karena Bertentangan dengan Prinsip Demokrasi dan Memundurkan Reformasi TNI	<a href="https://imparsial.org/hentikan-pembahasan-revisi-uu-tni-karena-bertentangan-dengan-prinsip-demokrasi-dan-memundurkan-reformasi-tni/">https://imparsial.org/hentikan-pembahasan-revisi-uu-tni-karena-bertentangan-dengan-prinsip-demokrasi-dan-memundurkan-reformasi-tni/</a>
3	01-06-2024	Penambahan Usia Pensiun Dan Perluasan Lembaga Sipil Dalam Rencana Revisi Undang-Undang TNI	<a href="https://berkas.dpr.go.id/pusaka/files/info_singkat/Info%20Singkat-XVI-12-II-P3DI-Juni-2024-1947.pdf">https://berkas.dpr.go.id/pusaka/files/info_singkat/Info%20Singkat-XVI-12-II-P3DI-Juni-2024-1947.pdf</a>
4	02-06-2024	Minim Partisipasi Publik, Revisi UU TNI dan UU Polri Disorot	<a href="https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/minim-partisipasi-publik-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-disorot">https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/minim-partisipasi-publik-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-disorot</a>
5	12-06-2024	Merespons Polemik Revisi UU TNI, Panglima TNI Sebut Aturan Tugas Prajurit Sudah Diatur Dalam UU TNI no 34 tahun 2004	<a href="https://cinews.id/12/06/2024/merespons-polemik-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-tni-sebut-aturan-tugas-prajurit-sudah-diatur-dalam-uu-tni-no-34-tahun-2004/">https://cinews.id/12/06/2024/merespons-polemik-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-tni-sebut-aturan-tugas-prajurit-sudah-diatur-dalam-uu-tni-no-34-tahun-2004/</a>
6	12-06-2024	Soal Revisi UU TNI, Panglima Minta Masyarakat Pahami Tugas Angkatan Bersenjata	<a href="https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-minta-masyarakat-pahami-tugas-angkatan-bersenjata-49875">https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-minta-masyarakat-pahami-tugas-angkatan-bersenjata-49875</a>
7	10-07-2024	Panglima Kekhawatiran Soal Revisi UU TNI	<a href="https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/bVDCgyLv-panglima-respons-kekhawatiran-soal-revisi-uu-tni">https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/bVDCgyLv-panglima-respons-kekhawatiran-soal-revisi-uu-tni</a>
8	14-07-2024	Putar Balik Arah Reformasi Militer: Dari Perluasan Jabatan Sipil	<a href="https://setara-institute.org/putar-balik-arah-reformasi-militer-dari-">https://setara-institute.org/putar-balik-arah-reformasi-militer-dari-</a>

		Hingga Mencabut TNI Berbisnis	Usulan Larangan	perluasan-jabatan-sipil-hingga-usulan-mencabut-larangan-tni-berbisnis/
9	27-07-2024	PDI-P Ingatkan UU TNI dan Jangan Mengarah ke	Revisi UU Polri Sampai Neo Orba	<a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/27/22390471/pdi-p-ingatkan-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-jangan-sampai-mengarah-ke-neo-orba">https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/27/22390471/pdi-p-ingatkan-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-jangan-sampai-mengarah-ke-neo-orba</a>
10	05-08-2024	Polemik UU TNI/Polri, Palguna: Reformasi	Melawan	<a href="https://diksimerdeka.com/2024/08/05/polemik-uu-tni-polri-palguna-melawan-reformasi/">https://diksimerdeka.com/2024/08/05/polemik-uu-tni-polri-palguna-melawan-reformasi/</a>
11	05-10-2024	Kemunduran Reformasi TNI Ancaman Demokrasi	Bagi	<a href="https://ylbhi.or.id/informasi/siaran-pers/kemunduran-reformasi-tni-ancaman-bagi-demokrasi/">https://ylbhi.or.id/informasi/siaran-pers/kemunduran-reformasi-tni-ancaman-bagi-demokrasi/</a>
12	05-10-2024	Catatan Hari TNI yang Dipublikasi KontraS juga Revisi UU TNI	oleh Soroti	<a href="https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/015162735/catatan-hari-tni-yang-dipublikasi-oleh-kontras-juga-soroti-revisi-uu-tni">https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/015162735/catatan-hari-tni-yang-dipublikasi-oleh-kontras-juga-soroti-revisi-uu-tni</a>

The above data are then processed using five steps of qualitative data analysis according to Creswell & Creswell (2018), namely: (1) compiling and preparing data from data sources that have been found for analysis; (2) reading and viewing the entire data to see the general picture and meaning contained in the information; (3) starting to code all data to label and group each information found; (4) compiling descriptions and themes using the results of coding to get a more detailed overall picture; and (5) presenting descriptions and themes in a narrative to convey the findings of the analysis.

This research uses *assumption Analysis* to provide an overview of the problems that may occur if the policy of expanding civilian positions in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army are carried out by the government. According to Dunn (2018), assumption analysis is an analytical technique that aims to synthesize conflicting assumptions related to policy issues. The assumption analysis will pay attention to positive and negative descriptions of conflicts and commitments. The stages in the assumption analysis consist of five stages, namely: (1) identifying policy actors. At this stage, policy actors are identified, ranked, and prioritized based on an assessment of the extent to which these actors are influenced and influence the policy process; (2) generate assumptions. At this stage, the researcher explores the data sources and assumptions underlying the recommendations given regarding the policy by the policy actors; (3) contrasting assumptions. In this third stage, researchers will systematically compare, contrast, and evaluate recommendations and underlying assumptions; (4) grouping assumptions. Assumptions that have been tested in the previous stage are then grouped based on their importance for

different policy actors; and (5) synthesizing assumptions. This last stage synthesizes the collected assumptions as a basis for conceptualizing the problem so as to produce the best solution.

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### *Identification of Policy Actors*

The parties affected by the policy of expanding civilian positions in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army (TNI) are analyzed by basing assumptions related to the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers from Indonesian national army Headquarters as the originator of the proposal to revise Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army, DPR RI officials who strengthen the proposal, PDI Perjuangan politicians as opponents of assumptions with counter positions and several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who have expressed rejection of the proposed expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers. In this study, DPR RI officials are the main policy actors with the highest hierarchy and have the authority to decide whether the revision is accepted into law or rejected. Policy actors in a counter position are politicians from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) of Struggle, researchers and several NGOs. The policy actors and their backgrounds can be seen in table 1 below.

Table 2. List of Policy Actors

<b>Policy Actors</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>Identification Category</b>
Sufmi Dasco Ahmad	Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives	Policy originator
General Agus Subiyanto	Indonesian national army Commander	Policy proponent
I Dewa Gede Palguna	Chairman of the Honorary Court of the Constitutional Court	Policy Supervisor
Djarot Syaiful Hidayat	Chairman of the DPP PDI Perjuangan	Political Party
Lucius Karus	FORMAPPI Researcher	Political Activist
SETARA Institute	Human Rights Organization	NGO
M. Ismur	Member of the Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform	NGO
Gufron Mabururi	Director of IMPARSIAL	NGO
Dimas Bagus Arya	KONTRAS Coordinator	NGO

All opinions were collected through mass media, official releases, and stakeholder websites and then grouped by the author into four categories, namely legal, management, social and democratic resilience. Of the seven policy actors, the assumptions are dominated by Non-Governmental Organizations. Although this policy does not directly affect the community directly, it will affect, the resilience of democracy in Indonesia.

### *Categorization of Policy Actors*

The assumptions of the policy actors that have been found are then grouped by category based on the content of their interests and analyzed to determine whether the assumptions are in a position to support (pro) or oppose (con).

Table 3. Policy actors' statements as the basis for assumptions

<b>Policy Actors</b>	<b>Assumption</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Category</b>
Sufmi Dasco Ahmad (Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives 2024-2029)	Provide limits on civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers and provide a legal umbrella for active Indonesian national army soldiers who have occupied new Ministries / Institutions formed after the enactment of the Indonesian national army Law of 2004 (Fitri, 2024).	Pro	Law
General Agus Subiyanto (Indonesian national army Commander)	This revision is in accordance with the Indonesian national army's duties in Military Operations Other Than War (Abdurrahman, 2024; Cinews, 2024). In addition, the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers aims to assist government programmes for the welfare of the community (Hafiez, 2024)	Pro	Management; Social
I Dewa Gede Palguna (Chairman of the Honorary Court of the Constitutional Court)	Civilian positions that can be occupied by Indonesian national army soldiers are considered an effort to revive the dual function of the Indonesian national army, which is contrary to the value of reform (Fathur, 2024).	Cons	Democracy Resilience
Djarot Syaiful Hidayat (Chairman of DPP PDI Perjuangan)	This revision risks returning the government system to an authoritarian state by giving excessive power to an institution (Nugraheny & Farisa, 2024)	Cons	Democracy Resilience
Lucius Karus (FORMAPPI Researcher)	The placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions is contrary to the Indonesian national army's function as a means of national defense, and thus, it can disrupt its defense organization because it is preoccupied with civil affairs. In addition, active Indonesian national army soldiers will find it difficult to serve and submit to the civilian hierarchy where they join (Susanto, 2024).	Cons	Management

<p>SETARA Institute</p>	<p>This revision has the potential to reverse the direction of reform with the addition of provisions where active Indonesian national army soldiers can occupy civilian positions in other Ministries / Institutions in accordance with presidential policies because the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers becomes unlimited. In addition, long-term effects can lead to accommodation politics that influence presidential policies (SETARA Institute, 2024).</p>	<p>Cons</p>	<p>Democracy Resilience</p>
<p>M. Ismur (Member of Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform)</p>	<p>This revision will worsen the governance of the security sector because even now there are placements of active Indonesian national army soldiers that are not in accordance with the law(Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, 2024). The revision that facilitates the transfer of Indonesian national army soldiers to civilian positions is feared to be abused by the President as well as the appointment of soldiers on a like-for-like basis to Indonesian national army soldiers (Taher, 2024).</p>	<p>Cons</p>	<p>Law; Democracy Resilience</p>
<p>Gufron Mabruuri (Director of IMPARSIAL)</p>	<p>The phrase "...as well as other ministries/institutions that require the energy and expertise of active Soldiers in accordance with the President's policy" opens up unlimited placement space for active Indonesian national army soldiers. This revision is intended to legalize the wrong policy regarding the placement of Indonesian national army soldiers outside the 10 agencies permitted by Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army. Another impact is the disruption of the ASN career path management system due to the presence of active Indonesian national army soldiers (Mabruuri, 2024).</p>	<p>Cons</p>	<p>Law; Managem ent</p>
<p>Dimas Bagus Arya (KONTRAS Coordinator)</p>	<p>Indonesian national army soldiers who are allowed to hold civilian positions may potentially alienate the main function of Indonesian national army soldiers in the national defense sector and away from military professionalism (Yunizar, 2024).</p>	<p>Cons</p>	<p>Managem ent</p>

The legal category is a category of assumptions that indicate that the policy to be taken will affect from a legal point of view, such as the rules and legality of the policy. The management category is a category of assumptions that indicate that policies can affect personnel management in the military/ Indonesian national army body itself and ASN personnel management. The social category demonstrates that policies can affect the interests of society in general. The democratic resilience category demonstrates that policies can affect the resilience of democracy in Indonesia.

Various points of view are seen from the opinions related to the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 concerning Indonesian national army conveyed by each policy actor. In general, the perspective of each policy actor is divided into four approaches: political, management, social, and approaches democratic. These approaches also have conflicting narratives that promote the pros and cons of the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers. Some policy actors believe that there is a mismatch between the objectives of implementing policies and the resulting impact on democratic resilience. Conversely, several other actors consider that the policy is in accordance with the regulations and has positive national and social goals.

The most common assumptions emerged from the search results were those that expressed opposition to the policy, especially in terms of democracy. The counter assumption considers that the government should not approve or implement the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers because it will damage the reform democratic that has been pursued since the end of the new order (Fathur, 2024; Nugraheny & Farisa, 2024; SETARA Institute, 2024). Other assumptions also highlight the impact on the professionalism of the Indonesian national army, which is disrupted due to civil affairs (Susanto, 2024; Yunizar, 2024). In addition, there is a risk of political interests arising and disrupting professional presidential policies (SETARA Institute, 2024; Taher, 2024). Another view also sees the policy as a way of legalizing ongoing legal violations due to the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers outside the Ministries/Institutions permitted by law (Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, 2024; Mabruri, 2024).

The assumption from Mabruri's point of view is that there is a problem also has an impact on the ASN, where civilian positions in the institution are occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers. The placement of Indonesian national army officers will ignore the ASN's specialization, competence, experience, and length of service in related agencies, thus disrupting ASN career development, which should be steady and tiered. This can result in ASNs being demotivated in terms of career paths and ranks in their institutions (Mabruri, 2024). The author's findings related to the assumptions of the policy actors are summarized in table 3 below to clarify the description of the arguments of each policy actor.

Table 4. Categorizing Policy Actor Assumptions

Assumption	Law	Management	Social	Democracy Resilience
PRO	Legal umbrella for the deployment of Indonesian national army soldiers (SDA)	In accordance with OMSP (JAS)	Community welfare (JAS)	-
CONTRA	Legalization of soldier deployment is not in accordance with the law (MI, GM)	Disrupts the professionalism of military work (LK, DBA)	-	Restoring the Indonesian national army Dwifungsi (IDGP)
		Disrupt ASN career management (GM)		Abuse of power by the President (SI, MI)
				Restoring the authoritarian government system (DSH)

*Description: Sufmi Dasco Ahmad (SDA); General Agus Subiyanto (JAS); I Dewa Gede Palguna (IDGP); Djarot Syaiful Hidayat (DSH); Lucius Karus (LK); SETARA Institute (SI); M. Ismur (MI); Gufron Mabururi (GM); Dimas Bagus Arya (DBA)*

Based on the table above, it can be seen that the main assumptions of policy originators and proponents focus on legal, management, and social aspects but do not mention democracy issues at all. However, the clash of assumptions present from the counter-policy actors, apart from discussing legal and management aspects, also discusses the impact on the sustainability of democracy, although the assumptions do not dispute the social aspects conveyed by the policy proponents. For example, the SDA considers that the revision of this law will become a legal umbrella for active Indonesian national army soldiers who currently hold civilian positions that are not listed in Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army. However, MI and GM argue that the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions that are not listed in the law is a violation of the law and that efforts to revise this law are tantamount to legalizing these violations. The same situation also occurs in the management aspect, where JAS considers the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions to be one of the roles of the Indonesian national army in its function in military operations other than war. This opinion is opposed by LK and the DBA, who consider that the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions actually damages the professionalism of Indonesian national army work. In addition, opposition was also expressed by GM, who considered that if civilian positions were occupied

by active Indonesian national army soldiers, it could interfere with ASN career management. In the social aspect, JAS considers that the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions indirectly improves the welfare of the community because it is a form of the Indonesian national army's role in assisting government programmes.

The most opposition is to democratic resilience, which allows the return of the dual function of the Indonesian national army (IDGP) and the abuse of power by the President (SI and MI), which in turn can restore an authoritarian form of government that is contrary to democracy (DSH). Political party officials believe that the policy to revise the law requires further scrutiny. In addition, policy watchdogs, political activists and NGOs consider the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian national army must be halted because of the great risks that can result from the revision.

***Assumption Grouping***

The revision of Law Number 34/2004 on Indonesian national army, which contains the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers, is important to be seen from a counter perspective so that the direction of change does not interfere with the development of democracy. After analyzing the assumptions, three results are obtained regarding the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers: (1) The policy is not appropriate if it is used as a legal umbrella for the placement of Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian positions because the current placement still has legal violations; (2) The policy has not adjusted to the function of military operations other than war with clear limits on professionalism; (3) The policy is not appropriate to be implemented because it threatens the resilience of democracy in Indonesia. The three results can be seen in the table below.

Table 4. Assumption Grouping Based on Importance

<b>Assumption</b>	<b>Law</b>	<b>Management</b>	<b>Democracy Resilience</b>
	Legalizing the placement of soldiers in civilian positions that are not in accordance with provisions	Disrupting the professional military	Restoring the authoritarian government system
Difference		Disrupting ASN career management in K-L areas occupied by Indonesian national army soldiers	Abuse of power by the President
			Restoring Indonesian national army 's Dwifungsi

Equation	Become a legal umbrella for Indonesian national army soldiers who occupy civilian positions in the new K/L	Implementing the Indonesian national army function in OMSP	No specific opinion
Conclusion	Has not addressed the difference in assumptions	Has not addressed the difference in assumptions	It does not answer the assumptions that arise

Adjustments to this policy can resolve the conflicting assumptions regarding pros and cons. In addition, adjustments can also prevent Indonesia from regressing democracy, as evidenced by the data obtained in this article. Looking back at the data obtained in this article, it appears that the DPR RI as the originator of the policy and the Indonesian national army Headquarters as the proponent of the policy only see the policy of expanding the civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army as a means of legal protection for soldiers who currently occupy a number of civilian positions that have not been listed in Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army because they consider this to be the implementation of one of Indonesian national army's duties in Military Operations Other than War (OMSP). However, the policy did not affect democratic resilience.

### *New Conceptualization of the Problem*

The three groups indicate the main issue of concern for policy actors who oppose efforts to revise Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian national army threatens democratic resilience. As seen in the effort to provide a legal umbrella for active Indonesian national army soldiers who are placed in civilian positions, this actually strengthens the assumption of the return of the ABRI dual function in the past. In addition, the professionalism of the Indonesian national army in the field of defense can decline because these soldiers also control civilian authority through their positions. The law and management group, if seen again, is a group of assumptions that lead to concerns about weakening civilian control over the military. In addition, policy actors who support the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers do not respond to assumptions about the threat to the resilience of existing democracy, thus strengthening concerns about the problem.

Based on this, the meta-problem analysis found the main problem concept of the discourse on the expansion of civilian positions that can be by active Indonesian national army soldiers, namely, occupied the expansion of military power in civilian government institutions which can reduce civilian control over the military because positions that should be filled by civilians are actually occupied by military soldiers.

## DISCUSSION

The policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers when viewed from the perspective of democratic resilience, it appears that the DPR RI has not paid attention to the impact on democracy in Indonesia. The role of civil society in controlling military power in the government is a way that can maintain the resilience of a country's democracy. The policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army can reduce civilian power or strengthen military power in government institutions.

Indonesia has undergone several types of "democracy" before reaching the current reform-era Pancasila Democracy. In fact, previous democracies have been closer to authoritarian rule, which is contrary to the meaning of democracy itself. One manifestation of the development of democracy in Indonesia was the separation between civilian and military power with the elimination of the ABRI dual function at that time. Although Pancasila Democracy has not completely eliminated the influence of the military in several civilian positions because certain expertise is still needed from Indonesian national army soldiers, the influence of the military has been severely limited to special positions. If this policy continues, the limits on the influence of previously established military forces will be reduced. In addition, problems, especially in the ASN career path that can be disrupted because positions that should be filled by civilian officials are occupied by Indonesian national army soldiers, can cause conflict within the Ministry/Institution. This can affect the performance of the organization itself.

The current implementation of Pancasila Democracy by the Indonesian government has undergone all four characteristics of democracy, according to Sisk (2017). The character of flexibility can be seen in the ability of Pancasila Democracy to absorb pressure when Indonesia was just entering the reform period after the collapse of the New Order. Pancasila Democracy could also recover and restore the meaning of democracy after the new order Pancasila Democracy had a tendency to be utilized by autocratic governments. In addition, Pancasila Democracy can also adapt to the needs of the Indonesian state which does not fully adopt liberal democracy, but also does not run an autocratic government. Innovative steps have also been taken to meet these challenges, such as the limited placement of military personnel in civilian positions. Whereas in liberal democracies, this is contrary to the meaning of democracy and in autocratic governments it is commonplace and even tends to be unrestricted, Pancasila Democracy innovates by still placing military personnel in certain and limited positions. However, if the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army was still implemented, this will actually push Pancasila Democracy toward an autocratic government.

A return to an autocratic system of government can undermine one of the four things that maintain democratic resilience according to Natalia et al. (2018), namely, the existence of strong institutions and a balance of power (*check and balance*) where civilian control of professional armed forces is an important factor

in it so as to be able to form a strong, independent, authorized and efficient judicial system. Judicial independence itself is part of one dimension of democratic resilience, namely government oversight (Natalia et al., 2018).

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research results, the policy of expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army is not appropriate. This policy has a negative impact on the legal aspect where the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers is actually an effort that legalizes the placement of soldiers in civilian positions that are not in accordance with the provisions. In terms of management, this policy will also affect military professionalism because it tends to take care of civilian affairs. In addition, the impact is also felt by ASNs in Ministries/Institutions occupied by Indonesian national army soldiers because their career management is disrupted. Meanwhile, the democratic resilience aspect is the most affected, as this policy will restore the dual function of the Indonesian national army, increase the risk of abuse of power by the president, and bring the country back to an authoritarian system of government.

It is important for the government to conduct a review of the policy to focus on the main objectives of placing Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions so that the policy to expand civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers does not actually damage the resilience of Pancasila Democracy that we are currently implementing in the government system. The results of this study can serve as a reference for the government in making policies that are more comprehensive and do not forget the main objectives of a policy. There needs to be collaboration between the government and various elements of society, including academics, in the preparation of a policy to achieve a policy that is beneficial to the country and society.

Recommendations that can be given and addressed to the House of Representatives as policy makers regarding the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army include the following:

1. Conduct an academic review regarding which positions really require special competencies that are only owned by Indonesian national army soldiers. This is important so that the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian institutions does not interfere with the professionalism of these Indonesian national army soldiers and limit military power in civilian institutions;
2. Mapping the ASN career path so that it is not disrupted due to civilian positions occupied by Indonesian national army soldiers. The entry of active Indonesian national army soldiers who occupy civilian positions in an institution can disrupt the ASN career system, which should be tiered and steady if not accompanied by structuring the ASN career system;
3. Eliminating the phrase "...as well as other ministries/institutions that require the energy and expertise of active Soldiers in accordance with the

President's policy" in Article 47 paragraph (2). This phrase is the main problem in democratic resilience because it can cause the President's power to be unlimited in controlling the placement of Indonesian national army soldiers in civilian positions.

4. Conduct periodic evaluations of Indonesian national army soldiers who occupy civilian positions. Evaluations must continue to be carried out to assess the benefits of Indonesian national army soldiers in a civilian position which makes it possible to return the soldier to his home institution if it is considered not to provide the expected benefits in accordance with his special competencies;
5. Report the evaluation results transparently to the public. This reduces the abuse of position authority by Indonesian national army soldiers because it is directly supervised by the public.

The recommendations given are expected to be a consideration for policymaking related to the placement of active Indonesian national army soldiers into civilian positions through the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army that does not damage the resilience of democracy in Indonesia.

#### ADVANCED RESEARCH

This research still has limitations, so more in-depth research is needed using different research methods regarding the expansion of civilian positions that can be occupied by active Indonesian national army soldiers in the revision of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning Indonesian national army so as not to damage the resilience of democracy in Indonesia.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank the National Resilience Studies Program, School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia, for providing support to complete this research. The author expresses gratitude to all those who provided assistance in the process of this research.

#### REFERENCES

- Abdurrahman, S. (2024, Juni 12). *Soal Revisi UU TNI, Panglima Minta Masyarakat Pahami Tugas Angkatan Bersenjata*. Tempo. <https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-minta-masyarakat-pahami-tugas-angkatan-bersenjata-49875>
- Achmad, A. T. D. (2024, Juli 12). *Sejumlah Pasal Diusulkan Masuk Dalam Revisi UU TNI*. hukumonline.com. <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/sejumlah-pasal-diusulkan-masuk-dalam-revisi-uu-tni-lt6690ddbd0dc2a/>
- Arinanto, S. (2024). *Hak asasi manusia dalam transisi politik di Indonesia* (8 ed.). Pusat Studi Hukum Tata Negara, Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Indonesia.
- Axtmann, R. (2022). *Democracy: Problems and Perspectives*. Edinburgh University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780748629121>
- Bagus, M., Mahmudah, A. H., Thobary, A., & Maulidah, F. (2021). Fenomena Pengisian Jabatan Pegawai Negeri Sipil Oleh TNI/POLRI. *Sosio Yustisia*:

- Jurnal Hukum dan Perubahan Sosial*, 1(1), 108–125.  
<https://doi.org/10.15642/sosyus.v1i1.69>
- Cinews. (2024, Juni 12). *Merespons Polemik Revisi UU TNI, Panglima TNI Sebut Aturan Tugas Prajurit Sudah Diatur Dalam UU TNI no 34 tahun 2004*. Cinews.id. <https://cinews.id/12/06/2024/merespons-polemik-revisi-uu-tni-panglima-tni-sebut-aturan-tugas-prajurit-sudah-diatur-dalam-uu-tni-no-34-tahun-20024/>
- Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (Fifth edition). SAGE.
- Dunn, W. N. (2018). *Public policy analysis: An integrated approach* (Sixth edition). Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Fathur, D. (2024, Agustus 5). *Polemik UU TNI/Polri, Palguna: Melawan Reformasi*. diksimerdeka.com. <https://diksimerdeka.com/2024/08/05/polemik-uu-tni-polri-palguna-melawan-reformasi/>
- Fitri, A. (2024). Penambahan Usia Pensiun Dan Perluasan Lembaga Sipil Dalam Rencana Revisi Undang-Undang TNI. Dalam *Info Singkat: Kajian Singkat Terhadap isu Aktual dan Strategis* (12 ed., Vol. 16, hlm. 6–10). Pusat Analisis Keparlemenan Badan Keahlian DPR RI. [https://berkas.dpr.go.id/pusaka/files/info\\_singkat/Info%20Singkat-XVI-12-II-P3DI-Juni-2024-1947.pdf](https://berkas.dpr.go.id/pusaka/files/info_singkat/Info%20Singkat-XVI-12-II-P3DI-Juni-2024-1947.pdf)
- Gunawan, A. B. (2017). Kontrol Sipil atas Militer dan Kebijakan Pertahanan di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru. *Jurnal Politik*, 2(2), 197. <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v2i2.117>
- Hafiez, F. A. (2024, Juli 10). *Panglima Respons Kekhawatiran Soal Revisi UU TNI*. metrotvnews.com. <https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/bVDCgyLv-panglima-respons-kekhawatiran-soal-revisi-uu-tni>
- Hanita, M. (with UI Publishing). (2020). *Ketahanan Nasional: Teori, Adaptasi, dan Strategi*. UI Publishing.
- Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Reformasi Sektor Keamanan. (2024, Oktober 5). *Kemunduran Reformasi TNI Ancaman Bagi Demokrasi*. YLBHI. <https://ylbhi.or.id/informasi/siaran-pers/kemunduran-reformasi-tni-ancaman-bagi-demokrasi/>
- Mabruri, G. (2024, Mei 31). *Hentikan Pembahasan Revisi UU TNI karena Bertentangan dengan Prinsip Demokrasi dan Memundurkan Reformasi TNI*. Imparsial: The Indonesian Human Rights Monitor. <https://imparsial.org/hentikan-pembahasan-revisi-uu-tni-karena-bertentangan-dengan-prinsip-demokrasi-dan-memundurkan-reformasi-tni/>
- Merkel, W., & Lührmann, A. (2021). Resilience of democracies: Responses to illiberal and authoritarian challenges. *Democratization*, 28(5), 869–884. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1928081>
- Mukhtar, S. (2017). *Militer dan Demokrasi*. Intrans Publishing.
- Natalia, C., Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi, & International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Ed.). (2018). *Global state of democracy, mengkaji ketahanan demokrasi: Ikhtisar*. Perkumpulan Untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi.

- Novavah, M. H. (2020). Analisis UU No. 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Kedudukan dan Peran TNI dalam Lembaga Pemerintahan Negara. *Rechtenstudent*, 1(1), 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.35719/rch.v1i1.8>
- Nugraheny, D. E. & Farisa. (2024, Juli 27). *PDI-P Ingatkan Revisi UU TNI dan UU Polri Jangan Sampai Mengarah ke Neo Orba*. KOMPAS.com. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/27/22390471/pdi-p-ingatkan-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-jangan-sampai-mengarah-ke-neo-orba>
- Romdoni, D., & Runturambi, A. J. S. (2024). Democracy and Human Rights as Pillars of National Resilience: A Theoretical and Empirical Review. *Asian Journal of Engineering, Social and Health*, 3(10), 2410–2418. <https://doi.org/10.46799/ajesh.v3i10.454>
- SETARA Institute. (2024, Juli 14). *Putar Balik Arah Reformasi Militer: Dari Perluasan Jabatan Sipil Hingga Usulan Mencabut Larangan TNI Berbisnis*. setara-institute.org. <https://setara-institute.org/putar-balik-arrah-reformasi-militer-dari-perluasan-jabatan-sipil-hingga-usulan-mencabut-larangan-tni-berbisnis/>
- Sisk, T. (2017). Democracy's resilience in a changing world. Dalam *The global state of democracy: Exploring democracy's resilience* (First edition, hlm. 36–67). International IDEA.
- Susanto, V. Y. (2024, Juni 2). *Minim Partisipasi Publik, Revisi UU TNI dan UU Polri Disorot*. kontan.co.id. <https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/minim-partisipasi-publik-revisi-uu-tni-dan-uu-polri-disorot>
- Sutrisna, T., & Rastika, I. (2024, November 14). *Usulkan Revisi UU TNI, Komisi I Fokus ke Aturan Pensiun dan Jabatan di Lembaga Sipil*. KOMPAS.com. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/11/14/14352531/usulkan-revisi-uu-tni-komisi-i-fokus-ke-aturan-pensiun-dan-jabatan-di>
- Syahrul, F., & Goncing, Muh. A. (2020). Analisis Keterlibatan Militer dalam Jabatan Sipil Tahun 2019 di Indonesia. *SOSIOHUMANIORA: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Sosial Dan Humaniora*, 6(2), 75–86. <https://doi.org/10.30738/sosio.v6i2.8080>
- Taher, A. P. (2024, Mei 29). *Polemik Revisi UU TNI yang Tidak Menjawab Kebutuhan Objektif*. tirto.id. <https://tirto.id/polemik-revisi-uu-tni-yang-tidak-menjawab-kebutuhan-objektif-gY35>
- Tilly, C. (2007). *Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Yunizar, S. (2024, Oktober 5). *Catatan Hari TNI yang Dipublikasi oleh KontraS juga Soroti Revisi UU TNI*. Catatan Hari TNI yang Dipublikasi oleh KontraS juga Soroti Revisi UU TNI - Jawa Pos. <https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/015162735/catatan-hari-tni-yang-dipublikasi-oleh-kontras-juga-soroti-revisi-uu-tni>